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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS

Paul C. Giannelli
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Eyewitness identifications, perhaps more than any
other type of evidence, have contributed to miscarriages of justice. Case histories of convictions. based
upon misidentifications have been documented by a
number of authors. See E. Block, The Vindicators
(1963); E. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932);
J. Frank & B. Frank, Not Guilty (1957); F. Frankfurter,
The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (1927); E. Gardner,
The Court of Last Resort (1952); Q. Reynolds, Courtroom (1950); G. Williams, The Proof of Guilt (3d ed.
1963); O'Connor, "That's the Man": A Sobering Study
of Eyewitness Identification and the Polygraph, 49 St.
John's L. Rev. 1 (1974). Furthermore, psychological
research has identified numerous deficiencies in identification testimony. One of the most thorough treatments of the psychological aspects of identifications
appears in an American Bar Foundation study. Levine
iil & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
'f!fff The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079
· (1973). That study concluded with the following comment: "This review of the psychological dimensions of
eyewitness identification has shown that the dangers
from fallible sense perception and memory and from
suggestive influence are overwhelming." /d. at 1130.
This article examines the constitutional and evidentiary problems associated with eyewitness identifications.
Right to Counsel
Prior to 1967 the reliability of eyewitness identifications was primarily a jury issue. In that year, however,
the Supreme Court decided three cases that "constitutionalized" this area of criminal law. Two of the
cases- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)- involved
the sixth amendment right to counsel. Because of the
innumerable ways in which identification procedures
can erroneously affect eyewitness identifications, the
Court in Wade held that a lineup is a "critical stage" of
the criminal process, thereby entitling the defendant to
the assistance of counsel. The presence of counsel,
according to the Court, would assure that a defendant
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could effectively challenge a subsequent in-court identification based upon a suggestive pretrial identification.
Since it appears that there is grave potential
for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial
lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure
a meaningful confrontation at trial, there cari
be little doubt that . . . [a post-indictment
lineup is] a critical stage of the prosecution
388 U.S. at 236-37.
Subsequently, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
( 1972), the Court restricted the right to counsel. Under
Kirby, the right to counsel attaches only after the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings
.... " !d. at 689. Thus, Kirby ignores the underlying
rationale of Wade, which is the need to protect the
accused's ability to confront effectively the
eyewitnesses' identification at trial. The "grave potential for prejudice" associated with identification procedures is not diminished simply because judicial criminal proceedings have not yet commenced. In addition,
the Court in Kirby failed to specify exactly when the
right to counsel attached. Wade involved a lineup
conducted after indictment while. Kirby involved a
lineup immediately following arrest. Some courts used
this factual difference in the two cases as a basis for
holding that the right to counsel applies only to postindictment identifications. The Supreme Court recently
rejected this view. In Moore v. Illinois, 98 S. Ct. 458
( 1977), the Court reversed a defendant's conviction
because he had not been afforded counsel at an identification made at the preliminary hearing: "The Court
of Appeals therefore erred in holding that petitioner's
rights under Wade and Gilbert had not yet attached at
the time of the preliminary hearing." /d. at 465.
While the Court has yet to decide a case involving a
lineup held prior to the preliminary hearing, language
in several of its opinions strongly suggests the right to
counsel may attach as early as the issuance of an
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arrest warrant, the filing of a complaint, or the initial
appearance. The Court's explication of the phrase
"adversary judicial criminal proceedings" in Kirby
included the "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 406 U.S. at
689. Since the Court explicitly mentions indictment
and information, the term "formal charge" must refer
to some other charging instrument. The only instrument besides an indictment or information that would
qualify as a charging document is a complaint. See 2
0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law 126
(1974) ("Rule 3 spells out the requirements for the
complaint, the basic charging document under the
rules.") This view is also supported by the Court's
language in Moore: "The prosecution in this case was
commenced under Illinois law when the victim's complaint was filed in court." 98 S. Ct. at 464.
Although not involving identification procedures,
another recent Supreme Court case sheds some light
on this issue. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
( 1977), the Court considered the right to counsel in
the context of police interrogation procedures. After
referring to the Kirby standard, the Court stated:
"There can be no doubt in the present case that judicial proceedings have been initiated against Williams
.... A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had
been arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a
Davenport courtroom, and he had been committed by
the court to confinement in jail." /d. at 399. This passage demonstrates that the Court in Kirby was not
using the term "arraignment" in its technical sense
(Grim. R. 10), but was referring to the initial appearance (Grim. R. 5(A)). It is common practice in many
jurisdictions to refer to the initial appearance as an
arraignment. See Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave, & J. Israel,
Modern Criminal Procedure 8 (4th Ed. 1974). This
same usage of arraignment appears in Holland v. Perini, 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1975). Holland was arrested
on May 9, 1970 for the robbery of a Cleveland restaurant, which had occurred the same day. The Sixth
Circuit held that a station-house identification conducted on May 24 violated the right to counsel under
Wade because the defendant had "been arraigned,
and adversary criminal proceedings had begun." /d.
at 103. It is clear that the court was referring to the
initial appearance under Rule 5 when it employed the
term "arraignment" because in another part of the
opinion the court states: "Arraignment occurred on
May 11 , and indictment followed on May 25." /d. at
102. The court left open the question of whether the
right to counsel "attach[ed] automatically upon the filing of an affidavit .... " /d. n. 1. One court, however,
has held that the issuance of an arrest warrant upon
information triggers the right to counsel. United States
ex ref. Robinson v. Zelker, 468 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1972). For citations to other cases, see All Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 448 (1975).

issue is People v. Williams, 3 Cal.3d 853, 478 P .2d
942 (1971), in which the California Supreme Court
held that the right to counsel extends to the actual
identification: "It is not the moment of viewing alone,
but rather the whole 'procedure by which (a suspect)
is identified' that counsel must be able to effectively
reconstruct at trial. If defense counsel is to be able to
intelligently cross-examine the witness, he cannot be
excluded from the moment of identification any more
than he can be excluded from the lineup itself." ld. at
856, 478 P.2d at 944. The Louisiana Supreme Court
recently adopted the same position in .State v.
McGhee, 350 So.2d 370 (La. Sup. Ct. 1977). These
cases are particularly persuasive because there is no
legitimate reason for the police to exclude counsel
from the witness-response stage. See Sobel, EyeWitness Identification: Legal and Practical Problems
119 (1972).
Waiver of Right to Counsel
Although the Supreme Court in Wade recognized
the possibility that a suspect entitled to counsel could
waive that right, the prosecution carries a heavy burden in establishing a waiver. It is incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson
v. Zebst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The Supreme
Court reiterated this standard in a recent sixth
amendment case: "We have said that the right to
counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant, and that courts indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver. This strict standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404
(1977). The Ohio Supreme Court has also carefully
scrutinized alleged waivers. See State v. Hurt, 30
Ohio St.2d 86, 282 N.E.2d 578 (1972.)
Exclusionary Rule
The principal remedy for violations of the right to
counsel is the exclusionary rule. Thus, testimony concerning a lineup identification at which the defendant
was denied the right to counsel is inadmissible. According to the Supreme Court, "[o]nly a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right
to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup."
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).
Even if the lineup is constitutionally defective because of the absence of counsel, a subsequent incourt identification may be admissible under certain
circumstances. The in-court identification is treated as
a "fruit of the poisonous tree" issue; it is only admissible if the prosecution can "establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications
[were] based upon observations of the suspect other
than the lineup identification." United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967}. The factors relevant to determining whether the in-court identification is derived
from an independent source include: "the [witness']
prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act,
the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-

Presence of Counsel
The courts are divided on whether the right to
counsel encompasses the actual identification of a
suspect by an eyewitness (some.times called the
"witness-response stage") as well as the viewing of
the suspect by that witness. The leading case on this
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on the reliability of the Identification procedure. In determining whether there has been a substantial likelihood of misidentification the trial court must evaluate
the "totality of the circumstances," including "the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time
of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal,
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the confrontation, and the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation." /d. at 199-200.
The Court's most recent treatment of the subject,
Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977), may
have altered again the due process test. After reaffirming Biggers and referring to the factors cited in
Biggers as relevant to the totality of the circumstances test, the Court stated: "Against these factors
is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself." /d. at 2253. Justice Marshall,
in a dissenting opinion, read this statement as a recognition of the continued validity of Stovall:
In assessing the reliability of the identification,
the Court mandates weighing 'the corrupting
effect of the suggestive identification itself'
against the 'indicators of [a witness'] ability to
make an accurate identification. The Court
holds, as Neil v. Biggers, supra, failed to, that
a due process identification inquiry must take
account of the suggestiveness of a confrontation and the likelihood that it led to misidentification, as recognized in Stovall and Wade.
Thus, even if a witness did have an otherwise
adequate opportunity to view a criminal, the
later use of a highly suggestive identification
procedure can render his testimony inadmissible.
/d. at 2260.
For a recent Sixth Circuit case reversing an Ohio
conviction because of an improper eyewitness identification, see Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081 (6th
Cir. 1977). See also, State v. Sheardon, 31 Ohio
St.2d 20, 285 N.E.2d 335 (1972).

lineup description and the defendant's actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person the identification by picture of the defendant prior
to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a
prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification." 388 U.S. at
241.
The stringency of the standard the prosecution
must meet in order to establish an independent
source is highlighted by the dissenting opinions in
Wade. Justice Black thought the clear and convincing
evidence standard "is practically impossible" to meet,
while Justice White characterized the test as "admittedly" a heavy burden for the State and probably an
impossible one." /d. at 248 and 251. The principal
Ohio cases are State v. Lathan, 30 Ohio St.2d 92, 282
N.E.2d 574 (1972) (independent source nc;>t established); State v. Hurt, 30 Ohio St.2d 86, 282 N.E.2d
578 (1972) (independent source established); State v.
Jackson, 26 Ohio St.2d 74, 269 N.E.2d 118 (1971)
(independent source established).
Procedurally, the constitutionality of eyewitness
identifications should be raised prior to trial. "Motions
to suppress evidence, including but not limited to
statements and identification testimony, on the ground
that it was illegally obtained" are governed by Criminal Rule 12(8)(3).
Due Process
At the same time it decided Wade and Gilbert, the
Court also held that identification procedures implicate
the due process clause. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 ( 1967). This development is important because a
criminal defendant's right to due process is more extensive than his right to counsel; all identifications are
subject to scrutiny under a due process analysis.
Thus, identifications made prior to the attachment of
the right to counsel, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
691 (1972), identifications involving photographic displays, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968), identifications conducted prior to the effective
date of Wade, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967),
and presumably, even identifications at which counsel
is present, may be suppressed as violative of due
process.
The standard used by the Court in determining
whether an identification comports with due process
has undergone a substantial evolution since Stovall
was decided. In Stovall, the due process test was
whether the identification was "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." 388 U.S. at 302. The focus of this test is the
reliability of the identification procedure used by the
police; if the procedure is both suggestive and unnecessary, it offends due process. Although the Court
considered the issue in a number of cases after
Stovall, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), it was not
until Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), that it became apparent that the Stovall standard had been altered. The new standard - whether a substantial
likelihood of misidentification has occurred - focuses
on the reliability of the actual identification rather than

Photographic Displays- Mug Shots
While a defendant does not have a right to counsel
at a photographic display, United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300 (1973), an identification based on such a
display may be subject to suppression on due process
grounds. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968); State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14, 358
N.E.2d 1040 (1976); State v. Hancock, 48 Ohio St.2d
147 (1976).
The use of photographs to bolster an in-court identification is impermissible if the photographs reveal the
defendant's prior criminal record. In State v. Breedlove, 26 Ohio St.2d 178, 271 N.E.2d 238 (1971), the
Ohio Supreme Court commented on this issue:
Under the circumstances in the case at bar,
we believe it unjustifiable for the state, on direct examination, to present police mug shots,
bearing police identification numbers, from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn
that the defendant, at some indefinite time in
the past had trouble with the law.
!d. at 184, 271 N.E.2d 241; accord, State v. Wilkin-
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son, 26 Ohio St.2d 185, 271 N.E.2d 242 (1971 ). Defense counsel must, however, make a timely objection
at trial or the error is waived. State v. Evans, 32 Ohio
St.2d 185,291 N.E.2d 466 (1972).

We do note parenthetically that the accused
himself has neither the facilities nor the experience to conduct an impartial lineup. The
burden on the police is a nominal one, as the
facilities, resources and other individuals who
may be used in conducting a lineup are generally available.
11 Cal.3d at 625-6, 522 P.2d at 686.
In United States v. Caldwell, 481 F.2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), the defendant's conviction was reversed
because his motion for a pretrial lineup was denied.
The court found the prosecutor's opposition to the motion inexplicable: "the [trial] court clearly had power to
order such a lineup, and we have considerable difficulty in understanding why the prosecution chose to
resist appellant's motion." !d. at 489. See also Berryman v. United States, 378 A.2d 1317 (D.C. Ct. App.
1977).

Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues
While it is clear that the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination is not implicated
in identification procedures, the fourth amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is a different matter. The fifth amendment issue
was addressed by the Court in Wade. Relying on its
decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), the Court held that the fifth amendment applied only to "testimonial or communicative" evidence
and that "compelling the accused merely to exhibit his
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior
to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give
evidence having testimonial significance." 388 U.S. at
222.
The fourth amendment issue arises when a defendant is illegally detained and then compelled to submit
to an identification procedure. In such a case the identification may be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Thus, in United States v. Edmonds, 432 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1970), the court held that· ''where flagrantly illegal arrests were made for the precise purpose of securing identifications that would not otherwise have been obtained, nothing less than barring
any use of them can adequately serve the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule." /d. at 584; accord,
Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 287 N.E.2d
599 (1972); State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d
583 (1970); People v. Bean, 121 Ill. App. 2d 332, 257
N.E.2d 562 (1970). A violation of the fourth amendment is independent of right to counsel or due process considerations; therefore, an identification
tainted by an illegal detention would be suppressed
irrespective of the presence of counsel or the lack of
unnecessarily suggestive procedures.

Hearsay
In-court testimony concerning a pretrial identification, either by the eyewitness or a witness to the identification, could constitute hearsay evidence.
Nevertheless, such testimony is admissible in most
jurisdictions as either an exception to the hearsay rule
or for a nonhearsay purpose - corroboration of the
in-court identification. R.C. 2945.55 controls the admissibility of such evidence; that provision reads:
"When identification of the defendant is an issue, a
witness who has on previous occasion identified such
person may testify to such previous identification.
Such identification may be proved by other witnesses." In State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St.2d- 83, 267
N.E.2d 291 (1971), the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted that provision as admitting prior identifications
"solely for the purpose of indicating the process by
which the accused was identified, where said process
is under attack, and to corroborate that identification."
/d. at 92, 267 N.E.2d at 297. Thus, such evidence is
admissible for corroboration only, which means the
eyewitness must first identify the defendant in court.
The proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence accord such
identifications a somewhat different treatment. Rule
801 (D)(1 )(c) follows the Federal Rules of Evidence
and treats prior identifications as nonhearsay evidence. Thus, prior identifications would be admissible
even if the eyewitness does not testify at trial. See
generally, 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence 801-102 (1975).

Defendant's Right to a lineup
In Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 617, 522
P.2d 681 (1974), the California Supreme Court held
that a defendant had a constitutional right to a Stateconducted lineup. The Court rested its decision on
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in which the
Supreme Court found that under certain circumstances the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violated due process. In Evans, the Court
stated:
Here petitioner seeks to compel the People to
exercise a duty to discover material evidence
which does not now, in effect, exist. Should
petitioner be denied his right of discovery the
net effect would be the same as if existing
evidence were intentionally suppressed. It is
settled that the intentional suppression of
material evidence denies a defendant a fair
trial. Brady v. Maryland. We conclude in view
of the foregoing that due process requires in
an appropriate case that an accused, upon
timely request therefor,. be afforded a pretrial
lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate.

Jury Instructions
Several courts, in an attempt to minimize the dangers of eyewitness identifications, have required
cautionary instructions. In United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court proposed the
following model instruction:
One of the most important issues in this case
is the identification of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime. The Government has
the burden of proving identity, beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the
witness himse.lf be free from doubt as to the
correctness of his statement. However, you,
the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasona-
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observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
1 again emphasize that the burden of proof
on the prosecutor extends to every e: 1 ~ment.of
the crime charged, and this spec1f1cally mcludes the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant
as the perpetrator of the crime .w!th which he
stands charged. If after examm1ng the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to
the accuracy of the identification, you mu~t
find the defendant not guilty. (Paragr~phs 1n
brackets are to be used only if appropnate.)
/d. at 558-59. The Telfaire court emphasized th~t a
failure to use the model instruction with appropnate
adaptations "would constitute a risk [of reversal] in future cases." /d. at 557. Several courts have explici!IY
mandated the use of this instruction or a substantial
equivalent. United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650,
653 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d
273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974). Other courts have expressed
their approval of the instruction. United States v.
Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Wilford,
493 F.2d 730, 734 n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. deni~~· ~ 19
U.S. 85l (1974). In most eyewitness identification
cases, the defense should request such an instruction.

ble doubt of the accuracy of the identification
of the defendant before you may convict him.
If you ar:e not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was the person who
committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of
belief or impression by the witness. Its value
depends on the opportunity the witness had
to observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable identification
later.
In appraising the identification testimony of
a witness, you should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had
the capacity and an adequate opportunity to
observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time
of the offense will be affected by such matters
as how long or short a time was available,
how far or close the witness was, how good
were lighting conditions, whether the witness
had had occasion to see or know the person
in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception through the
use of his senses. Usually the witness identifes an offender by the sense of sight - but
this is not necessarily so, and he may use
other senses.]
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification
made by the witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his own recollection? You may take into account both the
strength of the identification, and the circumstances under which the identification was
made.
If the identification by the witness may have
been influenced by the circumstances under
which the defendant was presented to him for
identification, you should scrutinize the identification with great care. You may also consider the length of time that lapsed between
the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a
factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
[You may also take into account that an
identification made by picking the defendant
out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results from
~the presentation of the defendant alone to the
witness.]
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to make an
identification of defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent with his iden:
tification at trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility
of each identification witness in the same way
as any other witness, consider whether he is
truthful, and consider whether he had the
capacity and opportunity to make· a reliable

Expert Psychological Testimony
Although there are few reported cases on the sub~;
ject, the use of expert testimony on the problems of
eyewitness identifications would be helpful to a jury's
evaluation of identifications. Several trial courts have
admitted this type of testimony. Note, Did Your Eyes
Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L.
Rev. 969, 1006 n.173 (1977). Assuming the expert is
qualified, the principal objection to this type of evidence is that the subject matter of eyewitness identifi~
cations is not outside the common knowledge of
jurors. The modern trend, however, is against adopting a narrow view of the scope of expert testimony.
Thus, proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." The purpose of expert testimony, as manifested in the proposed Rule, is to
assist the trier of fact. The Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which is identical to
proposed Ohio Rule 702, observes that the Rule
"recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a
dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to
apply them to the facts." In view of studies which indicate that jurors are overly impressed by eyewitness
identifications, an exposition on the psychology of
identifications would be extremely valuable. See Note,
29 Stan. L. Rev., supra, at 970 n.B. For a discussion
of Federal Rule 702, see 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidenc·e 702-4 (1975).
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trial. Also, for effective appellate review, the record
should reflect the factors which the court considered
!n exercising its discretion. State v. Carter, 53 Ohio
App.2d 125 (Scioto Cty. 1977).

Uncorroborated Testimony of Accomplice
R.C. 2923.03(D), which states that "[n]o person
shall be convicted of complicity under this section
solely upon the testimony of an accomplice, unsupport~ by other evidence," changes the general rule
formerly recognized in State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio
St.2d 124 (1972), that a conviction may be based on
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, except
where otherwise specifically provided by statute. The
testimony must be corroborated by some other fact,
circumstance, or testimony which also points to the
identity of the accused as the guilty actor. Evidence
merely showing that the crime was committed is insufficient. State v. Myers, 53 Ohio St.2d 74 (Tuscarawas
Cty. 1978).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Right To Be Present At Trial
The journal entry of the sentencing court recited
that the defendant was before the court when in fact
the official transcript showed the defendant was not
present at the time she was found _guilty and sentenced. Since Cnm. R. 43(A) provides that a defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial, including the imposition of the sentence, the judgment and
sentence were reversed. State v. Welch, 53 Ohio
St.2d 47 (Athens Cty. 1978).

Death Penalty Procedure -Burden of
Establishing Mitigating Factors
Under Ohio's death penalty procedure, R.C.
2929.04(8) provides a list of mitigating factors which
may serve to allow the defendant to avoid the death
penalty. It is, however, reversible error for a trial court
to place the burden of proving these factors upon the
defendant. The mitigation hearing is not adversarial in
nature, and neither the defendant nor the prosecution
has the burden of producing any evidence of mitigating circumstances. The defendant only bears the risk
of non-persuasion. State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St.2d 206
(Licking Cty. 1977).

Probable Cause and Improper Closing Arguments
Defendant was arrested after a search of his person
produced a glassine packet of heroin inside the
rolled-up portion of his jeans. The arresting officer had
entered a bar in which drugs were sold and where
four drug-related arrests had recently been made.
Despite the fact that the room was full, the officer focused his attention entirely on the defendant whose
name and record were unknown to him. The officer
had earlier seen the defendant with persons arrested
for narcotics and observed the defendant le11n forward
and place his hands and arms urider the table in the
vicinity of his legs. The defendant was stopped and
searched when he attempted to leave the premises.
Under the circumstances, the Court found that the officer had reason to be suspicious of the defendant,
but there was no probable cause to arrest him. Also,
the prosecutor in his closing argument in effect told
the jury that they could disbelieve an officer testifying
for the prosecution only at their monetary peril; if they
found against the officer, the city would have to pay.
Such direct appeals to the pecuniary interest of the
jury as taxpayers constitute reversible error. State v.
Hill, 52 Ohio App.2d 393 (Hamilton Cty, 1977).

Grand Jury Witnesses -Miranda Warning
The Justice Department has decided to give grand
jury witnesses a Miranda-type warning before their
testimony and to notify grand jury "targets" of their
target status where appropriate. The Department also
issued a general directive that prosecutors should not
present a grand jury with evidence which they know
was obtained as a "direct result of a clear constitutional violation." For details see, 22 Crim. L. Rep.
2423.
Right to Analyze Drugs
A defendant in a drug prosecution is denied due
process and the right of confrontation when the state
destroys all of the controlled substance during an unnecessary quantitative test; the state has a duty to
preserve some parts of the substance so that an independent chemical analysis may be made by the
putative law violator in the event criminal prosecution
is later instituted. People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d 573,
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977).

Physical Restraints on Defendant at Trial
At trial, the judge overruled a motion by defense
counsel to remove the shackles from the legs of the
defendant because the judge considered the use of
shackles to be the responsibility of the Sheriff. This
conclusion was found to be clearly erroneous. Because of the responsibility of the trial court to afford an
accused a fair and impartial trial, as part of due process, the trial court must exercise its discretion in
such matters. A defendant has the right to appear at
trial without shackles except when the court, in the
exercise of sound discretion, determines that restraint
is necessary for the safe and orderly progress of the

Search and Seizure
Defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and escorted
by police back into the room from which he came. The
Court held that a search of the room and seizure of
marijuana plants growing by the windows was invalid
because it involved areas beyond the confined reach
of the defendant.· Police observation of such plants
6

was freely, voluntarily and knowledgeably given and
that the interception of phone calls was within the
scope of consent. Since the consent obtained was to
allow the search of premises for money or cocaine, it
did not include the right to intercept incoming phone
calls. People v. Harwood, 22 Grim. L. Rep. 2298
(Calif. Ct. App. 1977).

from the street would also not furnish sufficient basis
tor such a warrantless seizure. People v. Robbins,
369 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. App. 1977).

Search and Seizure
Both due process and fourth amendment rights
were violated when police seized a packet of heroin
from the defendant's throat by choking and holding his
nose to prevent him from swallowing. Such behavior
is reminiscent of, if not more excessive than, that
condemned in Aochin v. California. The Court also
held a search warrant for a residence invalid since it
was based upon (1) information supplied by" the
defendant's children merely that he maintained
another residence (no information on criminal activities), (2) the heroin illegally seized from the defendant, and (3) an informant's statement that he believed the heroin was stashed nearby. The iilegally
seized heroin tainted the warrant under Wong Sun v.
u.s. and the independent information was insufficient
to provide probable cause. State v. Tapp, 22 Grim. L.
Rep. 2344 (La. Sup. Ct. 1977).

Unreasonable Automobile Search
Defendant was arrested for driving with an invalid
permit. Prior to arrest, the officer saw the defendant
make "furtive movements" and place a brown paper
bag under the car seat. The car was then driven to the
police station where the bag was examined and contraband discovered. The Court held the search unreasonable on several grounds. First, the search
could not be sustained as a warrantless automobile
search because the officer did not have probable
cause to search at the scene of the stop; the
defendant's movements and the partially hidden bag
were insufficient to establish probable cause. Second,
it could not be upheld as an inventory search because
the authorities must lawfully possess the car. Here the
police had no authority to impound the car without first
obtaining the defendant's consent or providing him an
opportunity to make other arrangements for its disposition. Third, the search was not incident to arrest because it did not occur at the time or place of the arrest. Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the
search was a "minimal" intrusion and thus reasonable
despite the absence of probable cause. Arrington v.
U.S., 22 Grim. L. Rep. 2411 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978).

Plain View
To justify a warrantless entry to seize suspected
narcotics paraphernalia under a plain view theory, it
must be immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them. Where the opening of the
door of a house by the wife of a man arrested for a
narcotics violation allowed a detective to view spoons
and strainers on top of a kitchen refrigerator, there
was no probable cause to believe that these items
were employed in narcotics activities, and thus their
seizure did not fall within the rule. U.S. v. Benn, 22
Grim. L. Rep. 2300 (E.D. N.Y. 1977).

Involuntary Confessions
Despite the initiation of a second inteiView with the
police by a teenaged defendant, the Court found the
confession made during that interview was inadmissible because of the police's repeated refusal to supply
a requested attorney and because of improper police
threats and inducements made during the course of
the first interview. People v. McClary, 22 Grim. L.
Rep. 2304 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 1977).

Plain View
An officer, who had recently sold his mobile home,
returned to it to inquire about possessions which he
had left there. While speaking to the defendant
through an open window, the officer noticed marijuana
plants growing inside the trailer. The officer then arrested the defendant and seized the plants. The Court
found that as a foundational prerequisite for the application of the "plain view" doctrine, there must be a
showing by the state of exigent circumstances. Plain
view of evidence, standing alone, is an insufficient justification for warrantless seizures. There were found to
be no exigent circumstances here because there was
no suggestion of potential flight or destruction of the
evidence. Thus, the search and seizure were unreasonable. The Court also held that the plain view
doctrine does not extend to pre-intrusion observation
of evidence within a "constitutionally protected area",
but only to cases where there is a justifiable prior intrusion. State v. Lane, 22 Grim. L. Rep. 2397 (Mont.
Sup. Ct. 1977).

Impeachment by Silence
A federal prison inmate, working as a janitor, found
an envelope containing marijuana. Guards later
searched him and discovered the envelope. The inmate was not asked any questions and remained silent until he was subsequently interviewed by the FBI.
Upon trial for possession of marijuana, the prosecutor
commented in closing argument on the defendant's
silence at the time of the search. In reviewing whether
these comments constituted reversible error, the
Court held that when an accused has not been given
a Miranda warning, his silence cannot be used to impeach his credibility, unless the silence is inconsistent
with innocence as well as with his exculpatory trial
testimony. The Court concluded that the defendant's
silence was consistent with his innocence and with his
statement to the FBI agent that he remained silent
because the guards did not ask him any questions
and because he feared reprisals from other inmates
who might consider him a "snitch." Thus, the com-

Phone Call Interception- Consent Search
The Court rejected the government's contention
that the right to conduct a premises search, whether
based upon probable cause or consent, includes the
right to intercept incoming phone calis. Where consent is involved, the government must prove that it
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ments were "highly prejudicial" and constituted plain
error. U.S. v. Henderson, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2388, (5th
Cir. 1978).

Hearsay Evidence -Guilty by Insinuation
Where the prosecution repeatedly referred to the
defendant by an alias and there was no admissible
p~oof that the defendant was in fact known by that
ahas, the defense was fatally prejudiced. The result of
this tactic of insinuation was to "splash" the defendant
with damaging matter that was not in evidence. U.S.
v. Hilliard, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2350 (D.C. Ct. App.
1977).

Collateral Estoppel
Where the defendant's imprisonment in another
state made it impossible for him to join in his
co-indictee's successful suppression motion, it was
held that the absent defendant may not later be prosecuted with the suppressed evidence. The Court
stated that the principles of fairness underlying the
collateral estoppel doctrine require the defendant be
afforded the benefits of the earlier ruling that the
search was unlawful. In so holding, the Court adopted
a flexible approach to collateral estoppel which focuses on the type of litigation and the details of the
prior adjudication. State v. Gonzales, 22 Crim. L. Rep.
2346 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1977).

Dismissal of Charge Added After
Defendants Assert Bail Rights
The Court dismissed a conspiracy count which was
addeci to the charges against the defendants, after
their successful assertion of a right to bail. The Court
was concerned that the additional charges would give
the appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The
suggested justifications of the inexperience of the
prosecutor and the unavailability of the grand jury
were rejected. It is the appearance of vindictiveness,
and not the actuality of such, which is crucial. U.S. v.
Andrews, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2481 (U.S.D.C., E.D.
Mich. 1978).

Withdrawal of Involuntary Guilty Plea
Defendant and his co-defendant pled guilty to an
indictment pursuant to a plea bargaining agreement
signed by the prosecutor and the public defender. Defendant later moved to withdraw his plea. In holding
.that the district court abused its discretion in not allowing withdrawal, the Court pointed out that the defendant had always m?intained his innocence and had
only pled guilty after being induced to do so by his
attorney of record. The attorney had told the defendant that he did not have a very good chance at trial
and that his co-defendant planned to plead guilty. As
a result, the defendant felt he could not prove his innocence. This raised serious doubts about the voluntariness of the plea - doubts which should be resolved in the defendant's favor. Gladu v. Eight Judicial
District, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2483 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1978).

Dual Representation
The Eight Circuit has extended its rule that trial
judges have an affirmative duty to advise defendants
of the potential danger of joint representation and of
their rights to conflict-free counsel to cases involving
retained counsel. Heretofore the rule was applied to
appointed counsel cases. Absent such notification, a
finding of knowing and intelligent waiver will seldom
be sustained by the court. U.S. v. Lawriw, 22 Crim. L.
Rep. 2369 (8th Cir. 1977.)
Unconstitutionality of Marijuana Law
The Court declared Florida's marijuana law unconstitutional as applied to private possession because
the legislature lacked a rationale basis for the decision
to ban the private possession of marijuana. The Court
found that the state failed to show that public health,
safety or welfare justified such legislation. The Court
also found the statute violative of the eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment because the punishment provided in the statute (up to 5
years imprisonment for private possession): (1)
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering; and (2) is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime. State v. Leigh, 22 Crim. L. Rep.
2407 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 1978).

Right To Be Present At Trial
At a bench conference following the presentation of
evidence in a criminal trial, the trial court considered
the possible bias of a juror. On appeal, the Court held
that such a conference was a stage of trial at which
the accused had a right to be present. Because the
bench conference involved a determination as to the
make-up of the jury, it was just as much a stage of the
trial as the initial impaneling of the jury. Therefore the
defendant had the right to be present, a right that
could not be waived by counsel. Bunch v. State, 22
Crim. L. Rep. 2415 (Md. Ct. App. 1978).
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